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RYLANDS v. FLETCHER IN ILLINOIS
EDMUND

W.

BURKE*

SINCE

1868 there has been full recognition by the courts
of England of the doctrine of absolute liability which
attaches, under certain circumstances, to the occupier of
real estate irrespective of his wilful or negligent fault. To a
large extent the courts of the United States have also
recognized the general principle that any person who brings
upon his premises that which is inherently dangerous will be
held absolutely liable for the harm which it causes in the
event that it escapes or participates in some activity which
is extra-hazardous in character to others. Such doctrine
springs from the celebrated English case of Rylands v.
Fletcher.'
Perhaps it would be well, at this point, to recall the
salient features of that case. It appeared there that the
defendants were the occupiers of land upon which there was
located an abandoned and filled-up coal mine shaft. This
shaft communicated with the coal mine of the plaintiff on
adjoining property. The defendants hired certain independent contractors to build, on defendants' property, a huge
reservoir for the purpose of storing water. These independent
contractors were negligent in that they failed to discover the
presence of the shaft but placed the reservoir in such a
position that when it was filled with water, in obedience to
the natural law of gravity, the water escaped through the
abandoned shaft flooding the mine of the plaintiff. Plaintiff
sued to recover the damages which he thus sustained. The
court properly held that the plaintiff could not recover upon
any theory of trespass, since the flooding was not direct and
Member of the Illinois Bar; Master in Chancery, Superior Court of CoolX
County, Illinois; Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Sub nora. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L. R. Exch. 265 (1866).
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immediate; nor could the plaintiff recover upon the theory
of nuisance, because nuisance, as it was understood at that
time, required continuous damage. It even held that the
plaintiff could not recover upon the theory of negligence,
though in this it probably acted in error. It did conclude,
however, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the
theory of strict or absolute liability, irrespective of fault
arising out of trespass, nuisance, or negligence.
Mr. Justice Blackburn, writing the opinion for the court,
announced the following rule:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing
that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default; or perhaps that the
escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God .... 2

The case was appealed to the House of Lords which
affirmed the decision of the Exchequer Chamber,' but Lord
Cairns qualified the rule as follows:
The Defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close
on which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that
close for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of
that land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface
or underground, and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken
place ...
On the other hand, if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of
their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a
non-natural use .

.

. then it appears to me that that which the Defendants

were doing they were doing at their own peril.

....

4

Subsequent to the announcement of this rule, certain
limitations upon and extensions of the doctrine were
recognized in England. In the case of Carstairsv. Taylor,5
for example, it was held that the liability would not be
imposed where the escape was due to a vis major. In the
case of Nichols v. Marsland,6 it was held that there would
2 Ibid., p. 279.
3 3 L. R. App. Cas. 330 (1868).
4 Ibid., p. 338-9.

5 6 L. R. Exch. 217 (1871).
6 10 L. R. Exch. 255 (1875).
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be no liability for the escape if it was due to an act of God.
The cases of Anderson v. Oppenheimer7 and Blake v. Woolf"
also held that the rule would not apply in the event of an
expressed or implied assumption of the risk, i. e. where consent on the part of the plaintiff might be found. In
still further cases, the courts have held that no liability
would attach unless the use to which the premises are put
is unusual in the sense that it is not a natural use. In other
words, the doctrine is limited to the "extraordinary" use of
land in the sense that the use is an unreasonable one taking
into consideration, as part of the surrounding circumstances, the nature of the locality where the activity is
carried on.
GENERAL AMERICAN TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, at an early date, met
with great opposition in the courts of this country,9 and both
the late eminent Professor Thayer 0 and Jeremiah Smith,1 1
as well as others, condemned the doctrine for assorted rea12
sons. Still other writers, however, notably Professor Bohlen,
have championed it on the ground that the individual who
engages in a hazardous enterprise, even though that enterprise be of economic value to society as a whole, should pay
his way including any damage inflicted as a consequence of
the hazard inherent in the enterprise.
Similarly, in praise thereof, the late Dean Wigmore said
that Justice Blackburn's generalization was "epochal in its
consequences." He further declared:
The practical effect of that great jurist's opinion has been to furnish us
with three main categories of acts to which Responsibility is affixed with
reference to specific harm, viz. (1) acts done wilfully with reference to
that harm; (2) acts done at peril with reference to that harm; (3) acts
done negligently with reference to that harm.' 3
7

5 Q. B. D. [1880] 602.

8 2 Q. B. D. [18981 426.

9 See, for example, Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442, 16 Am. Rep. 372 (1873);
Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339, 20 Am. Rep. 394 (1876); Losee v. Buchanan,
51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623 (1873).
10 See his article, Liability Without Fault, in 29 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1916).
11 Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification, 30 Harv.
L. Rev. 241 (1917).
12 See his article entitled "The Rule of Ryland v. Fletcher," 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
298 (1911).
13 Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-IIl, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1894),
at 454-6.
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The most recently published work on Torts, that of Professor
Prosser, 4 also presents an interesting commentary upon
the Rylands rule. He writes:
One factor which has played an important part in hindering the recognition of such strict liability has been the mushroom spread of the term
"nuisance." The American courts have shown a deplorable tendency to
call everything a nuisance, and let it go at that. Strictly speaking,
"nuisance" has reference to the type of interest invaded, and not to any
particular type of conduct from which the invasion results. 15 A nuisance
may be created by conduct which is intended to inflict damage, by negligence, or, in many cases, by an extrahazardous activity. 16 Strict liability
has tended to be absorbed into the broader, more undefined concept. The
very courts which have rejected Rylands v. Fletcher by name repeatedly
have imposed strict liability for nuisances, such as blasting or the storage
of explosives, which were called "nuisances" only because the activity
was a highly dangerous one. 17 Under this disguise the principle has in
fact received far more general recognition than has been admitted or
8
realized by the courts themselves.'
For these reasons, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher still is rejected
by name in the majority of the American jurisdictions. 19 But notwithstanding such obstacles, there is a very definite tendency in recent years
20
to recognize and accept the doctrine.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1941).
15 The author's original footnote 75 refers to Restatement, Torts, IV, Ch. 40,
p. 215.
16 The author cites Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R. I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934),
and Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 Camb. L. J. 189 (1931).
17 In support thereof the author cites McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J. L. 189,
36 Am. Rep. 508 (1880), stored explosives; Heeg v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579, 36 Am. Rep.
654 (1880), stored explosives; Longtin v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 P. 699, 65 L. R. A.
655 (1904),; blasting; Gossett v. Southern R. Co., 115 Tenn. 376, 89 S. W. 737,
1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 97 (1905), same; Landau v. City of New York, 180 N. Y. 48,
72 N. E. 631 (1904), fireworks; Birchard v. Board of Health of City of Lansing,
204 Mich. 284, 169 N. W. 901, 4 A. L. R. 990 (1918), pesthouse; Whittemore v. Baxter
Laundry Co., 181 Mich. 564, 148 N. W. 437, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 930 (1914), storage
of gasoline.
18 The author calls attention to the fact that in England this confusion has not
resulted, because such "nuisances" have been treated as applications of Rylands
v. Fletcher. He refers to Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co., 34 T. L. R. 500 (1918);
Hoare & Co. v. McAlpine, 1 Ch. [1923] 167; National Tel. Co. v. Baker, 2 Ch. [18931
14

186, 62 L. J. Ch. 699.
19 Recent cases in point, referred to in the author's note 79, are Anderson v.
Rucker Bros., 107 Wash. 595, 183 P. 70, 8 A. L. R. 544 (1919), affirmed in 107 Wash.
595, 186 P. 293 (1919); Fleming v. Lockwood, 36 Mont. 384, 92 P. 962, 14 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 628 (1907); Blake-McFall Co. v. City, of Portland, 68 Ore. 126, 135 P. 873
(1913); Philadelphia Ritz Carlton Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 282 Pa. 301, 127 A. 843
(1925).
20 Prosser, op. cit., 451-2.
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It is also significant to note that the doctrine has been
approved by the Restatement of Torts,"' and one writer
says: "It seems inevitable that the next half century will
find it firmly established in nearly all of our courts." 2 2
APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN

ILLINOIS

A great many theories have been advanced concerning

the origin of the rule and how it ever came to be, but it is
not the purpose of this article to discuss that point,23 for
the prime concern thereof, as the title would indicate, is the
effect of the rule of the Rylands case in Illinois.
It is significant to note that in none of the digests purporting to analyze the law existing in Illinois is there any
reference, as such, to the rule of absolute liability which the
owner of land assumes by bringing upon his premises something that is inherently dangerous, or who participates in
some activity upon his premises which is of extra-hazardous
nature and likely to cause mischief in the event it escapes.

For that matter, no reference is made to the occupier's
absolute liability for participating in some activity which is
extra-hazardous or inherently dangerous to others. One

writer, however, has declared that the courts in half of the
states have refused to follow the doctrine, and among those
so listed appears the name of Illinois. 24 As authority for
21 See Restatement, Torts, III, Ch. 21, §§ 519-20. Section 519 declares the rule to
be that "one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose
person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the
unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that
which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to
prevent the harm." Section 520 declares an activity to be "ultrahazardous" if it
"(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm . . . which cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage."
22 Prosser, op. cit., 452.
23 If the reader is interested in the evolution and genesis of the doctrine, he may
find excellent treatment thereof in the following articles among others: Bohlen,
The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 298 (1911); Pound, The
Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 365 (1940); Molloy,
Fletcher v. Rylands-A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266
(1942).
24 See note by M. S. Lindsay in 15 Tex. L. Rev. 355, particularly p. 360, note 37.
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such statement, he cites the case of City of Chicago v. Selz,
Schwab & Company.2 5
An examination of that case, however, will disclose that
it hardly warrants the assumption that this state has, in any
sense, repudiated or refused to follow the doctrine. That case
involved an action against the City of Chicago for damage
done by the escape of water from a fire hydrant. The facts
disclosed that there was a leak at the bottom of the hydrant
from which a small amount of water entered the plaintiff's
premises through certain small crevices in the floor of the
basement of the building. Plaintiff's servant warned the city
of that fact by telephone and also went twice that evening
to the proper department endeavoring to have the leak
attended to. Nothing was done, however, until the following
day when plaintiff's manager succeeded in getting a city
foreman to attend to the matter. The manager suggested
that the foreman shut off the water before endeavoring to
repair the leak, but the foreman refused and set his men at
work digging out the refuse around the hydrant. In so doing,
they moved the hydrant back and forth. The water pressure
was then about thirty-five pounds to the square inch, and the
concomitant result of the moving and the pressure produced
a break in the connection. The ensuing rush of water made
a hole through the side of the hydrant basin into the basement of the building, thereby damaging the plaintiff's goods.
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
against the City of Chicago on these facts, inasmuch as it
was acting in a proprietary rather than a governmental
capacity in furnishing the water, predicating its decision
upon the negligence of the defendant's servants. The court
made no reference to the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,
and an examination of the case would not indicate that any
suggestion was made of absolute liability. The negligence
on the part of the defendant's foreman was apparent, and
there was no need for the court to decide the case on any
other basis than that which it did, namely: negligence.
Another case in Illinois which might be suggested as
authority against the doctrine of the Rylands case, is that
of Jones v. Robertson.2" The facts there disclosed that the
25

202 IM. 545, 67 N. E. 386 (1903).

26 116 Il. 543, 6 N. E. 890 (1886).
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plaintiffs and the defendant were engaged in mining coal
from their respective lands which lay contiguous to each
other, the mine of the plaintiffs being upon a descending
grade so that any accumulated water would naturally flow
into it. The usual method then prevailing of getting rid of
mine water was to collect the same in a basin excavated
near the mouth of the pit and hoist it to the top of the shaft
in barrels. If the accumulation became too great, it was then
the custom and usage for the owner of the mine to protect
himself from the aggressions of the water as best he could
by the erection of a dam. The defendant had been compelled
to use this latter method in order to work his mines. Four
years after the building of the dam, it finally broke by reason of a constantly increasing pressure and the pent-up
waters poured through the defendant's mine into that of the
plaintiff. Upon this state of facts, the plaintiff asked the
court to give the following instruction:
If the jury believe, from the evidence, that there was a dam erected in
one of the main leads or ways of the coal mine of the defendant, either by
the defendant, or his lessee, by and with his knowledge and) consent, and
that by reason of such dam being erected the natural and ordinary flow
of the water percolating and flowing through said mine was checked, and
thereby accumulated in the mine of said defendant in a large and unusual
quantity back of and behind said dam, whereby said dam broke and gave
away, and precipitated with an irresistible force a large and unusual
quantity of water in and upon the mine of the plaintiffs, and drowned out
27
and destroyed the same, then the jury must find for the plaintiffs.

The trial court refused so to instruct, and plaintiffs excepted
thereto. A decision in the lower court for defendant was
appealed.
Plaintiffs cited, among other cases as authority for the
instruction in question, the case of Rylands v. Fletcher. The
court, when affirming the decision, declared that to give the
instruction would have been error. It did not, though, deny
the rule of the Rylands case but rather predicated its
decision upon the fact that the defendant had the legal right
as the upper proprietor to profitably work his mine, and that
if he could not do so without building a dam to protect him27

116 111. 543 at 550, 6 N. E. 890 at 893.
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self from surface waters flowing over his premises he had
the right to build such a dam, particularly since it was the
custom and usage among mine owners in the vicinity so to
do. The court further held, and it would seem properly so,
that if defendant had the right to build the dam in the first
instance and exercised ordinary care and skill in doing so,
he would not be, and should not be, held liable for the consequences if it subsequently gave way without any negligence or fault on his part.
Again, it might be suggested that such case is far from
authoritative on the point of repudiating the doctrine of the
Rylands case. One significant thing about the Illinois case
should be noted: the problem dealt with surface waters, a
substance which comes naturally upon the land. The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been, from the outset,
limited to things which are non-natural, a fact expressly
noted by Professor Bohlen in his comment upon this very
Illinois case when he wrote:
So in Jones v. Robertson, it was held that a mine owner, who, by
artificial banks, had diverted into a new channel a stream, which threatened to inundate his mine, was not liable because he had not collected on
his land any water not naturally there, but had merely protected himself,
28
as he lawfully might, against a natural enemy already on his premises.

It would seem well, therefore, to look at the other side
and note wherein Illinois has followed the principle of the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. First of all, it would be
wise for those who have classified Illinois as being among
the states which have repudiated or refused to follow the
doctrine, to examine the case of Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Co. v. Hunerberg. In that case, the plaintiff was
the owner of and resided in a house adjacent to the right of
way of defendant, near where defendant had laid a sidetrack. The defendant's servants backed a freight train down
this side-track. Certain of the cars left the rails by reason of
some defect thereof. Notwithstanding this, the engineer kept
backing the train until the end car went beyond defendant's
right of way, through the fence in front of plaintiff's house,
and finally struck and demolished the porch. Plaintiff, preg28
29

59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 298 at 443.
16 II. App. 387 (1885).
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nant at the time, was upstairs in the house with two young
children and suffered a miscarriage from the shock and
fright but was not otherwise injured. Defendant contended
that the only possible cause of action would be one for negligence but that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover for
her personal injuries, since the same were caused by mere
fright and the resultant shock to her nerves. Defendant's
theory proceeded on the basis that there was no proximate
causal connection between its carelessness and the injury,
relying upon the fact that where there is no physical impact
and the injuries result merely from emotional disturbance
recovery will be denied. 0 Despite this, plaintiff received
verdict and judgment in the lower court and defendant
appealed.
The opinion in the appellate tribunal, written by Justice
McAllister, affirmed the decision of the lower court, pointing out that defendant's liability was absolute and not predicated upon negligence. The court cited with approval the
case of Rylands v. Fletcher, saying:
But it was not necessary for the plaintiff to introduce evidence in the
first instance that the escape of these cars from the defendant's right of
way, and upon the premises where plaintiff resided, was the result of
negligence. It is a well settled rule of the common law, "that the person
who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril;
and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape ...
We can perceive nothing in reason or in the circumstances of this
case to derogate from the application of that doctrine in this case. Every
31
element involved in the rule is present.

No clearer application of the doctrine should be needed, but
other illustrations exist.
32
In the case of Indiana, I. & I. R. R. Co. v. Hawkins,
for example, the court applied the effect of the doctrine of
the Rylands case to damage caused by fire although not
3o See, for example, Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898).

3' 16 Ill.
App. 387 at 390.
32

81 II. App. 570 (1899).
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specifically mentioning it. The plaintiff there was injured by
reason of a fire set out by the servants of the defendant, upon the defendant's right of way, which escaped to
the adjoining land of the plaintiff. At the time the fire was
started, the wind was blowing in a favorable direction for
burning the dry grass along the right of way without any
danger of communicating the fire to adjacent property.
While so burning, however, a sudden gust of wind sprang
up from the opposite direction, carried the blaze across the
track, ignited the grass on the plaintiff's land, and burned
over about three acres thereof. Neither counsel for the plaintiff nor for the defendant appear to have cited any authorities, but the court pointed out that the only defense available
was that of an act of God, or of inevitable accident. Concluding that the defendant was liable, it stated:
Fire is a dangerous element, and one who sets it out upon the open
prairie must be prepared to take care of it and prevent its escaping and
doing damage to others or be liable for the consequences. 33

There can be no question but that such statement is an
application of the doctrine of absolute liability here under
consideration. It must be conceded that fire, under certain
circumstances, is an inherently dangerous element, so that
one who starts it would seem to do so at his peril.
The rationale of the case might be a throwback to an early
English doctrine which imposed strict liability for the escape
of fire, 84 a doctrine so absolute in character as to require
an act of Parliament to alter it." It is not suggested that
such is the true basis for the decision. The case might,
rather, serve to support the proposition that, following the
Rylands rule, one lighting a fire on his own premises is
accumulating an unnatural substance there which will entail
strict responsibility so far as keeping it within bounds is
concerned.
There is still another group of Illinois cases which fall
within the ambit of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, those
which involve the use of explosives for some lawful purpose,
such as blasting, but from the use of which injury or dam38 81 Ill. App. 570 at 572.
34 Burton v. McClellan, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 434 (1840); Johnson v. Barber, 10 Il. 425
(1849).
35 6 Anne, c. 31 (1707); 14 Geo. III, c. 78, § 86 (1774).
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age follows as a proximate consequence thereof. Some jurisdictions have held that liability in such cases is predicated
upon nuisance or negligence. Others have held that the liability exists irrespective of nuisance, negligence, or trespass
for it is regarded as absolute in character. Illinois clearly
follows the latter view. Thus, in the case of City of Joliet v.
6 it was necessary to blast rock in the course of
Harwood,"
constructing a public work. The blasting took place in a
public street, but the evidence disclosed that the contractor
used all due care, skill and caution in the performance of the
task. Nevertheless, a stone was thrown against the building
of the plaintiff thereby causing the injury complained of. The
lower court decision in favor of plaintiff was affirmed upon
appeal, the Supreme Court basing its opinion upon the inherently dangerous character of the work and saying in part:
In this case the work which the contractor was required by the city to
do was intrinsically dangerous, however carefully or skillfully done. The
right of recovery in this case does not rest upon a charge of negligence on
the part of the contractor; it rests upon the fact that the city caused work
to be done which was intrinsically dangerous-the natural (though not the
was the injury to plaintiff's property. In
necessary) consequence of which
37
such case the city is responsible.

Even stronger is the subsequent case of FitzSimons &
Connell Company v. Braun"' in which the defendants, a contracting company and a municipality, in the course of constructing a tunnel, exploded heavy charges of dynamite.
The effect of these explosions was to shake and jar the plaintiff's building, causing the floors and walls to sag, crack
and separate and generally to impair the utility of the building. On appeal from a decision favoring the plaintiff, one of
the principal grounds relied on was a claimed error in an
instruction given by the lower court to the effect that one
who makes use of an explosive on grounds near the property
of another, when the natural and probable though not the
inevitable result of the explosion is injury to said property,
is liable for the resulting injury however high a degree of
care and skill may have been exercised in making use of
the explosive.
86 86 IM. 110 (1877). Scott, J., dissented on the ground that the doctrine of
respondeat superior could not apply.
37 86 Il. 110 at 111-2.
38

390, 65 N. E. 249 (1902).
199 Ill.
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The exception so taken by the defendants unequivocally
raised the rule of the Rylands case. In an opinion written
by Justice Boggs, the lower court action was affirmed. The
opinion is an exhaustive one on the point for it comments
upon the rule as applied in a number of other jurisdictions
and mentions favorably the decision in the City of Joliet case
above referred to. While the court recognized that in that
case there had been an actual invasion of the property of
the plaintiff, inasmuch as the explosion had precipitated
rock against the building, it declared such fact should make
no difference. Instead, it emphatically stated:
If one who, for his own purposes and profit, undertakes to perform a
work, by means of explosives, inherently dangerous to the property of
another, should be held liable for an injury occasioned by any substance
cast by the explosives on the property of such other, it is only by the
merest subtility of reasoning he should be held not liable to respond for
equal or greater damage caused by the concussion of the air or of the
earth. There is no ground of substantial or practical distinction. The case
of Bradford Co. v. St. Mary's Co. [60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N. E. 528] may be
regarded as authority for the view that liability in such cases is not
restricted to an actual invasion of the property, but damages for consequential injuries may be recovered. The doctrine of the charge to the
39
jury we think correct.

It might be added that while the court recognized that contrary rulings existed in some other jurisdictions, it saw no
reason to take Illinois from among those states imposing
strict or absolute liability. The still more recent case of
Baker v. S. A. Healy Company40 has but followed in that.
direction.
Yet another group of Illinois cases, if not clearly within
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, certainly provides a
close analogy thereto. Such cases involve the doing of work
of a dangerous character by an independent contractor hired
by the owner. In such situations it has been uniformly held
in this state that, if the work contemplated is inherently
39 199 Il. 390 at 397, 65 N. E. 249 at 251. In the Bradford case, referred to by the
court, the action was brought to recover for injury caused by concussion and vibration and was predicated upon an indirect and consequential invasion rather than
a direct one. The court there said: "Where the owner of a stone quarry, by blasting
with gunpowder, destroys the buildings of an adjoining land owner, it is no defense
to say that ordinary care was exercised in the manner in which the quarry was
worked." See 60 Ohio St. 560 at 567, 54 N. E. 528 at 529 (1899).
40 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N. E. (2d) 228 (1939).
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dangerous, the owner cannot avoid liability merely because
he has given the performance of the task to an independent
contractor. In the case of Sherman House Hotel Company v.
Gallagher,4 it is true, the court held that the contractor was
not really an independent one, but it did go on to say that
even if he had been the defendant would be liable upon the
theory that the work was intrinsically dangerous. That view
was subsequently followed in Andronick v. Daniszewski 2 in
which Justice Matchett, delivering the opinion of the court,
made an exhaustive survey of the cases both in Illinois as43
well as in other jurisdictions. The case of Van Auken v. Barr
also raised a similar question for there one defendant,
lessee of the premises from another defendant, subsequent
to the lease, employed a contractor to raze the building on
the premises. While the independent contractor was so engaged, a brick fell from the wall and injured plaintiff, a
pedestrian. Reliance was placed, for defense, on the fact
that the work was being done by an independent contractor
over whom the defendants had no control. Despite this, the
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from
both defendants; that his remedy was not predicated upon
the negligence of anyone; but was, instead, predicated
upon the inherently dangerous character of the work itself.
Escape of substances from the land when razing a building
was regarded as sufficient to bring the defendants within the
ambit of the rule.4 4
CONCLUSION

From this analysis it would certainly appear that the
doctrine of absolute liability, suggested by the case of
Rylands v. Fletcher, has at least in part been recognized by
the courts of Illinois. The question remains whether the
future will see it developed to include even more situations
than those to which it has already been applied. The author
is not unsympathetic with the early authorities which criticized the doctrine, but they came at a time when this country had nowhere nearly reached its present point of
economic and commercial development. There was, per43 270 Ill. App. 150 (1933).
42 268 Ill. App. 543 (1932).
It is significant that the court quoted with approval from City of Joliet v.
Harwood, 86 Ill. 110 (1877).
41 129 Ill. App. 557 (1906).
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haps, a reason then for encouraging industry, commerce,
and manufacturing in every possible way, even if this encouragement took the form of providing immunity to the
pioneers thereof from harms caused to others in the absence
of wilful or negligent fault. That situation, however, no
longer exists today. There is no reason now why a person
who engages in an enterprise upon his own premises for his
own gain should not pay for harms that he causes to others
by reason of that enterprise, whether guilty of fault in the
conduct of the enterprise or not.
It has been suggested that the remedies in trespass, in
nuisance, and in negligence are broad enough to cover any
situation that might be encompassed by the rule of the
Rylands case. Such a suggestion seems but to beg the
question. It is entirely conceivable that an area might be
exclusively devoted to the manufacture of something that is
inherently and intrinsically dangerous. To engage in such
an enterprise within such an area would not constitute a
nuisance. Damages might flow from the escape of the thing,
or as an incident to its manufacture, without there being any
negligence. The damages might be indirect and consequential, so no recovery might be had in trespass. Yet, if damage
results to others, a recovery should be had. The basis of
liability should be the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. Others
have expressed the view that it is inevitable that such
doctrine will grow. That it should justifiably do so is also the
conclusion of this author.
ADDENDA

Having long been of the opinion that the Illinois courts
should give plain, unconcealed, and frank recognition to
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, I have read the manuscript of the above article with great interest and with full
approval. In the round-table discussion of Green v. General
4 5 at the meeting of the Association of
Petroleum Corporation,
American Law Schools in December of 1931, the late Professor Bohlen said that, in his opinion, modern industry
should bear losses inflicted by it on neighbor's lands as well
as those inflicted upon its own lands. This seems to be the
real crux of the question. In law, as elsewhere in life, com45

205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 60 A. L. R. 475 (1928).
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plete intellectual honesty is more useful in the directing of
human affairs than is circumvention or circumlocution such
as we find in achieving the result of absolute liability by
calling the case one of nuisance or of negligence even when
there is doubt or a complete negation of both nuisance and

negligence in the facts.
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